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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from the Order of the Third Judicial Dis-
trict Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah in which the trial 
court lifted an Ex-parte Temporary Restraining Order and denied 
plaintiff's Motion for a Preliminary Injunction enjoining the 
defendant from terminating her pregnancy. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this matter 
pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (2) (g) and 
Rules 3(a) and 4(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
In accord with the United States Supreme Court' s decision in 
Planned Parenthood of Missouri v Danforth, its predecessors and 
its progeny, did the trial court correctly hold that a man cannot 
force a woman, even his wife, to bear his child by enjoining her 
from terminating her pregnancy during the first trimester? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Michael Jon Reynolds ("plaintiff") commenced the instant 
action in March, 1988 by filing a Complaint for divorce. At that 
time, the defendant, Jennifer Franks Reynolds (hereinafter "defen-
dant'1) was eighteen (18) years old. The parties were married on 
November 7, 1986 and have one child, born on June 3, 1987. 
Concurrent with the filing of a Complaint for divorce, plain-
tiff sought an Ex-Parte Temporary Restraining Order and Order to 
Show Cause to restrain the defendant from terminating her then 
existing pregnancy. In his affidavit supporting the Ex Parte 
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, plaintiff stated defendant 
was approximately ten (10) weeks pregnant, he had commenced an 
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action for divorce seeking custody of the unborn child and defen-
dant' s planned abortion would cause him irreparable and permanent 
injury for which there was no relief available in law, equity or 
otherwise. See, Plaintiff's Affidavit, attached hereto as Exhibit 
"A, " at paras 4, 7 and 9. In his Complaint for divorce, plaintiff 
requested the defendant be enjoined from terminating her pregnancy 
as "plaintiff was opposed to this and desires the custody, control 
and association with said child." 
Defendant filed an Answer and Verified Counterclaim, a copy of 
which is attached hereto and marked as Exhibit "B." Defendant 
noted she was in the seventh i,7th) week of pregnancy She further 
explained that, prior to the parties' separation, plaintiff at-
tended the meeting between she and her physician and, at that 
time, plaintiff was not only in favor of terminating the defen-
dant' s pregnancy, he scheduled the appointment for defendant' s 
abortion. See, Answer and Verified Counterclaim, attached hereto 
as Exhibit " B, " paras 27 and 28 It was not until after the 
defendant left the plaintiff, as a result of his extramarital 
affairs, that plaintiff objected to the scheduled abortion. 
The district court issued an Ex Parte Temporary Restraining 
Order, as a result, defendant was unable to keep the date set by 
plaintiff for her to terminate her pregnancy 
A hearing on plaintiff s Order to Show Cause for a preliminary 
injunction was held before the Honorable Judge David S. Young, 
Judge, on March 30, 1988. Plaintiff submitted a Memorandum in 
Support of Restraining Order, (copy attached hereto as Exhibit 
" C" ) which emphasized his desire to take custody of the child and 
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to relieve defendant of her liability therefore. See, Memorandum 
in Support of Restraining Order at pages 1, 4 and 7. 
Defendant submitted two (2) Memoranda of Points and Authori-
ties in Support of Defendant' s Motion to Vacate Temporary Restrain-
ing Order and Order to Show Cause (copies attached hereto as 
Exhibit "D" ). In those memoranda, defendant relied upon the 
authority of Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U S 
52, 69 (1975) and its progeny for the proposition that a woman's 
constitutional right to privacy prohibits a father or husband from 
vetoing her decision to terminate her pregnancy. 
Judge Young held that the ruling in Danforth was controlling, 
lifted the Temporary Restraining Order and denied plaintiff's 
Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. 
Plaintiff immediately submitted a Motion to Restore the 
Restraining Order to this Court Based upon that Motion, the 
Restraining Order was reinstated. However, prior to the time the 
Restraining Order was served upon the defendant, her pregnancy was 
medically terminated. As a result, defendant moved to vacate the 
Interlocutory Appeal as moot; defendant' s motion was granted on 
March 31, 1988. 
Although neither memoranda submitted to the district court 
included any argument as to the trimester of defendant' s pregnancy 
and the issue was not accepted as a dispute m the district court. 
However, the Motion to Restore Restraining Order indicate that: 
"the disputed facts in this case are how far along Respondent is in 
her pregnancy. Appellant believes that she is twelve (12) weeks or 
more along and Respondent maintains she is not so far along. " That 
argument is particularly surprising, given that the plaintiff s own 
affidavit in support of his Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, 
which was submitted only a week prior to his Motion to Restore the 
Restraining Order, placed the pregnancy at ten (10) weeks. 
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On April 15, 1988, plaintiff filed a motion in the district 
court to certify the abortion Order as a final judgment for appeal 
under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff's 
Motion was granted by Order of the District Court entered on May 
20, 1988. 
While the appeal has been pending m this Court, the parties' 
divorce action has proceeded in the district court. In the divorce 
action, plaintiff seeks custody of the parties7 eighteen (18) month 
old son and alleges that he is a fit and proper person to be 
granted said custody. Defendant denies that allegation and re-
quests that she be granted custody of the parties' child. In 
support of her request for custody, defendant filed an affidavit 
noting that she had been the primary caretaker of the child until 
she began work in January of 1988 and thereafter, when she went to 
work, the child was cared for by her aunt or her mother. Defendant 
notes that plaintiff rarely tock responsibility for the child and 
was physically abusive to the plaintiff. See, Defendant' s Af-
fidavit m Support of Motion for Temporary Relief attached hereto 
as Exhibit " E, " paras. 1-14. ^  Plaintiff countered with an af-
fidavit setting forth allegations formulated to support an argument 
that defendant was an unfit mother and, in fact, neglected the 
minor child. See, Affidavit of Michael Jon Reynolds attached 
hereto and marked as Exhibit UF. " 
The District Court bifurcated the divorce issues from the 
issue now on appeal. However, a brief picture of the divorce 
proceedings may assist this Court to understand the practical 
difficulties inherent in the • balancing'1 approach advocated by 
plaintiff on appeal. 
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On May 2, 1988, at a hearing on plaintiff's Objection to 
Commissioner' s Ruling on Defendant' s Motion for Temporary Relief, 
the district court ordered that: (1) defendant be granted temporary 
custody of the parties' minor child; (2) plaintiff pay defendant 
the sum of not less than $300. 00 per month m child support 
commencing April 1, 1988; and (3) both parties cooperate in the 
performance of a custody evaluation to be commenced within forty-
five (45) days of the date of the Order, the expense to be paid 
two-thirds (2/3) by plaintiff and one-third (1/3) by defendant. 
See, Order on Order to Show Cause attached hereto and marked as 
Exhibit "G. " On September 1, 1988, defendant filed a Motion for 
Order to Show Cause in re: Contempt (copy attached hereto as 
Exhibit "H"). In support of said Motion, defendant submitted an 
Affidavit indicating that plaintiff had not paid child support for 
the months of July and August and had failed to pay two-thirds 
(2/3) of the expense of the custody evaluation as previously 
ordered 
A hearing on defendant' s Motion for Contempt was held Septem-
ber 13, 1988. At the hearing, Domestic Relations Commissioner, 
Sandra N. Peuler, found that plaintiff was in default of his 
obligation to pay two-thirds (2/3) of the cost of the custody 
evaluation and recommended plaintiff be ordered to pay the obli-
gation within ten (10) days. The Commissioner also recommended 
that judgment for delinquent child support in the amount of $320.00 
be entered against the plaintiff. The plaintiff objected to the 
Plaintiff had paid $305.00 toward his obligation between 
the filing of the Motion for Contempt and the hearing thereon. 
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Commissioner' s recommendation that he pay his share of the child 
custody evaluation. On September 15, 1988, the plaintiff filed a 
motion to have his child support obligation reduced to $100.00 per 
month, effective September 1, 1988, on the grounds that he had been 
laid-off on August 31, 1988 and would be relying upon $201.00 per 
week unemployment for his support. On September 22, 1988, plain-
tiff filed a Motion to Order Home Study by the Department of Social 
Services requesting that the Utah Department of Social Services 
perform the custody evaluation at no or low cost based upon the 
fact that, three (3) months after he was ordered to pay for the 
custody evaluation, he lost his j ob. 
Plaintiff s Motion to Reduce Temporary Child Support was heard 
by Commissioner Peuler on September 23, 1988 who recommended that 
plaintiff s child support obligation be reduced from $300.00 to 
$150. 00 per month beginning October of 1988 and required that 
plaintiff report his efforts to secure employment to defendant's 
attorney, in writing, on a monthly basis. Defendant objected to 
the reduction in child support. A hearing on plaintiffs objection 
to the Order requiring him to pay two-thirds (2/3) of the custody 
evaluation and on defendant's objection to the reduction in child 
support were held before the court on October 17, 1988. The 
district court affirmed the reduction of child support and ordered 
the defendant to pay two-thirds (2/3) of the costs of the child 
custody evaluation within thirty (30) days of the date of the 
hearing. Since entry of the judgment, plaintiff has been consis-
tently late in paying his child support obligation and has, as of 
the date of this writing, paid nothing toward the cost of procuring 
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a custody evaluation to assist the court in determining custody of 
the parties' child. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
In Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, the United 
States Supreme Court held that no third party, not even a woman' s 
husband, has the right to veto the decision, reached by a woman and 
her physician, to terminate her first trimester pregnancy 
Furthermore, the Court noted that, inasmuch as it is the woman who 
physically bears a child, the right to privacy that protects her 
decision to terminate a first trimester pregnancy outweighs the 
interests that a third party may have in continuation of her 
pregnancy. In accord with that precedent, every appellate court 
faced with the issue has held that a husband or father cannot 
enjoin a woman from terminating her pregnancy in the first 
trimester Following suit, the trial court in the instant case 
correctly refused to issue a preliminary injunction enjoining the 
defendant from terminating her pregnancy. 
POINT II 
The Fourteenth Amendment protects a person's fundamental 
rights from infringement by the state; one person' s infringement on 
another's fundamental rights—with no state mvolvement--is not a 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, in the instant case, 
the plaintiff s argument that his constitutional rights were 
violated fails because the defendant' s decision to terminate her 
pregnancy was a purely private decision and no state intervention 
was necessary to carry out her decision. 
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Moreover: (1) plaintiff's right to procreate remains intact. 
However, it is up to the plaintiff, not the trial court, to find a 
woman willing to bear plaintiff's child; (2) the right to rear 
children is not implicated because an embryo in the first trimester 
of gestation is not a "child"; and (3) denying plaintiff the 
ability to force defendant to bear his child does not unfairly 
discriminate against him on the basis of gender; it merely places 
the parties on equal footing as neither can force the other to bear 
a child. 
POINT III 
It has been long established that the actions of a state 
court, applying statutory or common law, is state action restricted 
by the Fourteenth Amendment, even if the law is applied in a civil 
suit between private parties. Thus, the trial court in the instant 
case correctly held that it was bound by the Fourteenth Amendment 
and could not intercede on plaintiff's behalf to enjoin the 
defendant from terminating her pregnancy. 
POINT IV 
No third party can veto a woman' s decision to terminate her 
pregnancy in the first trimester. That constitutional mandate 
cannot be circumvented by a state through passage of laws that 
dictate when life begins. Thus, Utah law protecting children, 
parents and the family does not, and could not constitutionally, 
include in the definition of "child" an embryo in the first 
trimester of gestation in order to give the plaintiff the right to 
veto the defendant' s decision to terminate her pregnancy. 
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Moreover, Utah had a law requiring the consent of a woman' s 
husband and the embryo' s father before a woman could terminate her 
pregnancy. A provision of the same law gave the father and the 
husband the right to resort to the courts to enjoin the abortion if 
they so desired. The law was found to be unconstitutional by the 
United States District Court for the District of Utah. Utah law 
now provides only that a husband must receive notice of his wife' s 
intent to terminate her pregnancy so that he may play a role, at a 
private level, in his wife' s decision. Nothing in Utah law now 
requires that a husband or father consent to an abortion or gives 
him the right to enlist court assistance if he disagrees with his 
wife' s decision. Thus, the trial court7 s decision in the instant 
case was consistent with Utah law. 
POINT V 
The decision to become a parent belongs to each individual, 
married or single. Thus, despite the fact that procreation may be 
a primary purpose of marriage, no man may force his wife to bear 
his child by vetoing her decision to terminate her pregnancy during 
the first trimester. 
POINT VI 
The balancing act advocated by the plaintiff is dispro-
portionately perilous for a woman in that it may result in her 
enduring an unwanted pregnancy and bearing the burden of deciding 
whether to place the child she has born for adoption or rearing 
the child with inadequate resources. 
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POINT VII 
This court is not at liberty to reverse the Supreme Court' s 
decisions in Roe v. Wade and its progeny. Unless the Supreme Court 
overturns those decisions, this court is bound by their precedent 
to uphold the trial court' s ruling. 
POINT VIII 
Defendant is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees under 
Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3 and Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure because plaintiff's appeal is frivolous and because 
defendant's need and the plaintiff's ability to pay justify an 
award of fees in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT' S DECISION IN 
PLANNED PARENTHOOD OF MISSOURI v. DANFORTH PRECLUDES A FATHER 
FROM UNILATERALLY VETOING A WOMAN'S DECISION TO TERMINATE HER 
PREGNANCY IN THE FIRST TRIMESTER. 
iL The Supreme Court' s decision in Danforth governs the 
instant action. 
The plaintiff acknowledges that the decision of the United 
States Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 
428 U.S. 52 (1975) prohibits a husband from vetoing the decision 
of a woman to terminate her pregnancy. Plaintiff seeks to limit 
the holding of Danforth to instances where a husband is granted an 
absolute right to veto a woman' s decision, arguing that Danforth 
does not preclude a court from balancing the rights and interests 
of a father in determining whether it is appropriate that the 
father be allowed to insist that a woman bear his child. 
- 10 -
Contrary to plaintiff's argument, Danforth did not limit its 
application to cases in which a husband was given an absolute veto 
over a woman' s choice to terminate her first trimester of 
pregnancy. In Danforth, the court held that the authority to 
prevent an abortion cannot be granted to " any particular person, 
even the spouse" during the first trimester of a woman' s pregnancy. 
Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U. S. at 69 
[emphasis added]. 
Moreover, the plaintiff s distinction between a veto right 
that results from balancing a father' s interests and one that is 
absolute is a distinction without a difference. In either case, 
the deprivation of a woman' s right to choose to terminate her 
pregnancy is equally complete and, as a result, in both cases the 
woman must remain pregnant against her wishes and succumb to a 
third party' s desire that she bear the child. Thus, in this 
setting a veto is a veto, whatever its origin. 
The Court in Danforth was cognizant of the difficulty involved 
in weighing the interest of a woman' s spouse when he disagrees with 
the decision to terminate a pregnancy. The Court held that, in 
the face of such conflict: 
Inasmuch as it is the woman who physically bears the 
child and who is more directly and immediately affected 
Moreover, plaintiff's plea for temporary veto power 
ignores the reality that his "temporary veto" may be permanent. As 
the Supreme Court acknowledged in Roe v. Wade, the health risks 
involved with an abortion procedure increase with the passage of 
time. As a practical matter, an attempt to fit an evidentiary 
hearing into a trial court' s docket may cause sufficient delay in 
the ability to terminate a pregnancy to reverse a woman' s decision 
to obtain an abortion, based upon increasing risks to her health, 
or require her to face the increased risks in order to carry out 
her desire to terminate her pregnancy. 
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by the pregnancy, as between the two, the balance weighs 
in her favor. 
428 U. S. at 71. 
Thus, the Court m Danforth has acknowledged that, until a man 
can arrange to bear his own child, nature has placed the burden of 
gestation and child birth upon the woman. As a consequence of 
that burden, when balancing the interest of a father in an existing 
first trimester pregnancy, the balance is invariably weighted in 
favor of the woman' s right to decide whether to continue the 
pregnancy. 
£L Courts have unanimously held that a woman' s right to 
determine whether to continue a first trimester pregnancy outweighs 
a father' s interest. 
A reading of plaintiff s brief gives the impression that 
plaintiff s appeal ventures into uncharted territory, which falls 
into an area that the courts have carefully avoided by limiting the 
application of Danforth. That is simply not the case. 
Plaintiff cites Wolfe v. Schroenng, 541 F. 2d 523 (6th Cir. 
1978) for the proposition that courts have limited Danforth and 
refused to determine whether a statute narrowly drafted to allow a 
husband something less than an absolute veto on a woman' s decision 
to terminate her pregnancy would pass constitutional muster. See, 
Appellant' s Brief at p. 3. In fact, the Circuit Court of Appeals 
in Wolfe held that a state cannot authorize a spouse, parent or 
guardian to veto a woman' s decision to abort a pregnancy in the 
second trimester of pregnancy "for no reason or an impermissible 
reason, to wit, other than protecting] maternal health," such as 
protecting unrecognized interest in fetal life. 541 F. 2d at 523. 
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Thus, Wolfe actually extends Danforth and Roe v. Wade to their 
logical conclusion by determining that a woman' s choice to abortion 
m the second trimester cannot be vetoed by a spouse absent 
legitimate concern for maternal health. The only issue reserved 
in Wolfe was whether "a more narrowly drafted requirement of 
spousal consent, permitting the husband/father to 'veto' a post-
viability abortion" could survive constitutional challenge. 541 
F. 2d at 526 [emphasis added]. The issue of a father's interest in 
a viable fetus is not addressed in Danforth or its progeny and, in 
fact, a holding that a father' s interest in a viable fetus 
outweighs the mother' s right to terminate her pregnancy may well 
be consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Roe and 
Danforth. Thus, Wolfe does not limit application of Danforth; it 
simply refuses to extend the Danforth holding to third-trimester 
pregnancies. 
Nothing in Wolfe or any other decision indicates that the 
holding of Danforth should be limited to allow a father to veto a 
woman' s choice to terminate her pregnancy. 
In Point III of his Appellate Brief, Plaintiff argues that 
the right to abortion is not absolute and therefore should be 
balanced with the father' s rights. See, Brief of Appellant at pp. 
15-16. Defendant agrees that the right to determine whether to 
terminate her pregnancy is not absolute but must be considered 
against important state interests in regulation. Roe v. Wade, 410 
U. S. at 154. However, until the end of the fist trimester, when the 
state interest in regulation becomes compelling, the woman, m 
consultation with her physician, is free to determine whether to 
terminate her pregnancy. Moreover, during that time period, the 
right to prevent the abortion cannot be granted to any particular 
person. Danforth, 428 U. S. at 69. Thus, while defendant' s right to 
terminate her pregnancy is not absolute, the right is broad enough 
to withstand the plaintiff s efforts to use the state court to 
prevent her from having an abortion. 
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The Supreme Court has consistently reaffirmed its holding that 
the state may not override the choice of an adult woman, in 
consultation with her doctor, to terminate her first trimester 
pregnancy. See e. g. Thornburgh v. American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 90 L.Ed 779 (1986); City of Akron 
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983). In 
reaffirming this position, the Supreme Court has emphasized that 
" [ f ] ew decisions are more personal and intimate, more properly 
private, or more basic to individual dignity and autonomy, than a 
woman7 s decision . . . whether to end her pregnancy. A woman' s 
right to make that choice freely is fundamental. " Thornburgh, 90 
L. Ed at 801. 
Consistent with the principal, even before Danforth, courts 
held that a father could not intervene to prevent a woman from 
terminating her pregnancy. See, Jones v. Smith, 278 So. 2d 339 
(Fla. Ct. App. 1973); cert, denied, 415 U.S. 958 (1974); Doe v. 
Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189, 193 (D.Utah 1973) (striking down, as 
unconstitutional, a Utah stature requiring that a father and/or 
husband consent to an abortion). In the wake of Danforth, several 
courts have rejected the arguments raised by plaintiff and held 
that a husband and/or father cannot interfere with a woman' s 
decision to terminate her first trimester pregnancy. Conn v. 
Conn, 526 N. E. 2d 958 (Ind. 1988) (specifically rejecting the 
"balancing of interests" approach advocated by plaintiff) 
application for stay denied, No. A-88-55 U.S. (July 22, 1988); cert 
denied 109 S.Ct. 391 (1988); Coleman v. Coleman, 5 7 Md. App. 7 5 5, 
472 A. 2d 1115 (1984); Doe v. Doe, 365 Mass. 556, 314 N. E. 2d 128 
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(1974); John Doe v. Jane Smith, 527 N. E. 2d 177 (Ind. 1988), 
application for stay denied, 108 S. Ct. 2136 (1988); Jane Doe v. 
John Smith, No. 84A01-8804-CV-00112, Slip. Op. (Ind. Ct.App. Oct. 
24, 1988). 
In short, the decisions of the United States Supreme Court and 
their progeny have made it "crystalline" that 
a woman in her first trimester of pregnancy, in 
consultation with her physician, may elect to terminate 
the pregnancy, and neither the state nor the woman' s 
spouse, nor the father of the child has any right to 
intervene so as to prevent her decision from becoming 
fact. 
Coleman, 471 A. 2d at 1119. 
That precedent should, by all rights, conclude any argument on 
the merits of plaintiff's claim that he was wrongfully denied an 
opportunity to have his interests "balanced" so that he could 
obtain a court order forbidding the defendant from terminating her 
pregnancy It has been conclusively determined that plaintiff has 
no such right. 
POINT II. 
DENYING PLAINTIFF THE RIGHT TO FORCE DEFENDANT TO BEAR 
HIS CHILD DOES NOT VIOLATE PLAINTIFF'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. 
Aj, Completely private acts, such as a woman's decision to 
terminate her pregnancy, do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Plaintiff argues that the defendant' s decision to terminate 
her pregnancy violated his constitutional right to procreate, to 
rear and enjoy his offspring and discriminates against him on the 
basis of gender. In fact, plaintiff s constitutional rights are 
in no way implicated. The Constitution certainly protects the 
rights cited by the plaintiff; however, those rights are 
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constitutionally protected against government action not against 
wholly private actions. See, Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 9-12 
(1883) ("Individual invasion of individual rights is not the 
subject matter of the [Fourteenth] Amendment."); see also Rendell-
Baker v. Kahn, 457 U.S. 830, 837 (1982). Every case cited by the 
plaintiff in support of his constitutional claims involves state 
action affirmatively interfering with the rights of an individual. 
In this case, defendant' s choice involves no state action. 
Justice Stevens recently pointed out the flaw in plaintiff7 s 
argument when denying an application for injunction in a legally 
and factually similar case, John Doe v. Jane Smith, 108 S. Ct 2136 
(1988). Justice Stevens wrote: 
I have serious doubts concerning the availability of a 
federal remedy for this claim in view of the fact that 
Jane Smith7 s decision to obtain an abortion can be 
carried out without any action on the part of the State 
of Indiana or any other state governmental subdivision. 
Id. at 2137. 
The constitutional rights asserted by plaintiff act only as "a 
shield for the private citizen against government action, not a 
sword of government assistance to enable him to overturn the 
private decisions of his fellow citizens. " Doe v. Doe, 365 Mass. 
556, 314 N. E. 2d 128, 132 (1974) (the court in Doe, rejected a 
request by a man to enjoin a woman's abortion, noting that there 
was no "basis for the husband's assertion that the Constitution 
enables him to summon the Commonwealth to help him in a dispute 
with his wife." Id.). Plaintiff improperly seeks to twist the 
rights that the Constitution prctects against government intrusion 
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into swords that call forth judicial action to subordinate women to 
their husband' s will. 
fii. Plaintiff's right to procreate remains intact. 
Plaintiff s argument that his right to procreate has been 
violated by defendant' s decision to terminate her pregnancy is 
completely frivolous. Plaintiff clearly has a right to have 
natural children. However, it is up to the plaintiff, not the 
courts, to find someone willing to bear plaintiff s child. 
The implications of plaintiff s interpretation of the right to 
procreate are staggering. Plaintiff claims that, to protect his 
right to procreate, courts may compel a woman to bear his child. 
If that is correct, may a court also order a party to refrain from 
the use of contraception, or to use contraception, to accommodate 
another parties desire to have, or refrain from having, children? 
As noted by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts: 
[W]e would not order either a husband or a wife to do 
what is necessary to conceive a child or prevent 
conception, any more than we would order either party to 
do what is necessary to make the other happy We think 
the same considerations prevent us from forbidding the 
wife to do what is necessary to bring about or prevent 
birth . . Some things must be left to private 
agreement 
Doe v Doe, 314 N. E. 2d at 132. See also Jones v. Smith, 278 So. 2d 
at 339 (wherein the court queries. If a man has a right to enjoin 
an abortion, could he then, by virtue of his right to choose not to 
procreate, compel a woman to have an abortion?) Fortunately, under 
the current state of the law, no court will be forced to determine 
to what extent it may order a party to do what is necessary to 
conceive, to give birth, or to prevent contraception and birth. 
Such court interference would violate the constitutional right to 
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procreate. A court7 s refusal to intervene in a couple' s decision 
on contraception and birth is simply an act of good judgment, 
coupled with a correct application of existing constitutional law. 5 
£L No right to rear children is implicated. 
Plaintiff argues, at some length, that the defendant's 
decision to terminate her pregnancy infringed upon his right to 
"raise, associate with, and enjoy [his] children." Brief of 
Appellant, p. 5. Certainly, both fathers and mothers have 
constitutional rights to their children that are protected from 
unjustified state interference However, those rights are not 
implicated here because the case involves neither a child nor a 
father Rather, the issue here is whether a man can force a woman 
to bear a child in order to satisfy his desire to have a child. 
Plaintiff' s alleged parental rights are based upon his opinion 
that life begins at conception, so that an embryo is a "child" and, 
having fertilized the ovum, he is a "father" The plaintiff's 
opinion on when life begins permeates his appellate brief, from 
beginning to end, in his various references to events that took 
place while the "child was still living," to his attestation that 
he sought to "save" his "child". Brief of Appellant at pp. v n and 
12, respectively. However, plaintiff s theory of life has no legal 
D
 Plaintiff argues that divorce courts are the proper forum 
for a man to obtain an order anjoimng his wife's abortion and 
laments that, if the court is denied the ability to issue such an 
injunction, there will be no opportunity for court intervention m 
a dispute between a man and hus wife over whether a pregnancy 
should be terminated. Brief of Appellant, at pp. 29-30 Plaintiff 
ignores the fact that there is not a legal forum for resolution of 
all domestic disputes and courts have never held it appropriate to 
intervene to resolve a married couple' s dispute over whether to 
have children. 
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relevance. The Court in Roe rejected a state's efforts to have 
plaintiff's theory of life enshrined as law. See, Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113, 159-62 (1973); see also Akron, 462 U.S. at 444 ("a state 
may not adopt one theory of when life begins to justify its 
regulation of abortions"). 
Utah, in accord with the Supreme Court' s ruling, does not have 
a law dictating that anyone accept plaintiff s theory of life. 
Yet, plaintiff herein seeks to convince this court that the trial 
court should have: (1) adopted his theory; (2) embedded it in the 
constitutional right to rear children; and (3) concluded that his 
right to rear children was not only protected from governmental 
intrusion, but formed a basis justifying affirmative court action 
to force her to bear his child. That reasoning directly conflicts 
with the Roe/Akron mandate that a state refrain from using the 
theory that life begins at conception to regulate abortion. Thus, 
contrary to plaintiff7 s argument, his right to rear children is 
not, and cannot be, implicated in defendant' s decision to terminate 
her pregnancy. 
CL Gender discrimination is not an issue. 
In a final effort to convince this Court that his 
constitutional rights have been impaired by his inability to force 
defendant to bear his child, plaintiff argues that allowing 
defendant to unilaterally refuse to give birth after she conceived 
discriminates against him on the basis of gender. Brief of 
Appellant, pp. 16-19. 
That argument is flawed, in the first instance, for the same 
reason that his prior constitutional arguments fail. The 
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Constitution prevents the state from denying a person equal 
protection under the law. Thus, where a law contains a 
classification based upon gender, the "classification by gender 
must serve important government objectives and be substantially 
related to achievement of those objectives." Craiq v. Boren, 429 
U.S. 190 (1976). In the instant case, there is no law, no 
classification and no state action. Thus, the equal protection 
clause, and its prohibition on unfair discrimination have no 
application. 
Plaintiff's argument also fails because allowing the defendant 
to decide to terminate her pregnancy does not involve unfair gender 
discrimination. In fact, allowing the defendant to make that 
decision places the parties on equal footing. The defendant 
certainly cannot force the plaintiff to bear her child and, by 
virtue of defendant' s right to terminate her pregnancy, plaintiff 
cannot force defendant to bear his. A contrary result would, in 
fact, be discriminatory as a woman could be forced to endure 
pregnancy and child birth against her will--a threat no man faces. 
POINT III. 
TRIAL COURT INTERVENTION ON PLAINTIFF'S BEHALF WOULD HAVE 
BEEN STATE ACTION IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. 
After arguing that defendant' s decision to terminate her 
pregnancy violated his constitutional rights, plaintiff asserts 
that, had the state court intervened to veto defendant' s decision, 
defendant' s constitutional rights would not have been violated 
because the court' s intervention would not constitute state action 
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barred by the Fourteenth Amendment. Brief of Appellant at pp. 25-
30. 
It is well established that the actions of the judiciary, as 
an arm of the government, are state actions that may not encroach 
upon federal rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. See 
e. g. Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 108 
S. Ct. 1341, 1345-46 (1988)(holding that, a court's involvement in 
triggering a statute of limitations constitutes state action); 
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 n. 1 ( 1984) (" The actions of 
state courts and judicial officers in their official capacity have 
long been held to be state action governed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment") citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) and Ex 
Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880); New York v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 
254, 265 (1964) (holding that, a state court's application of 
common law was state action in violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, although the lawsuit in which the court acted was a 
civil suit between private parties) See also Rothenberger v. Doe, 
149 N.J. Super. 478, 374 A. 2d 57, 59 (1977) (holding that although 
there was no state statute involved in a father7 s attempt to 
restrain a woman from terminating her pregnancy, "any compulsion 
by a state court to require consent of a natural father would 
constitute unauthorized and unconstitutional state interference. " ) 
Plaintiff cites Evans v. Abbney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970) for the 
proposition that, by allowing a court to enforce a testator' s 
discriminatory intent, the Supreme Court has backed away from its 
age old holding that court action is state action. In fact, in 
Evans, the Court noted that the result of the trial court' s 
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decision was not discriminatory, but had the effect of eradicating 
the testator' s discriminatory intent. 396 U. S. at 445. Thus, the 
Supreme Court held that the trial court' s action did not violate 
the Fourteenth Amendment, not because the trial court was not a 
state actor, but because the trial court did not violate any right 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. 
In short, plaintiff cites no case that stands for the 
proposition that state court action applying state law or common 
law is not state action that is restricted by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Contrary to the plaintiffs argument, the Supreme Court 
has consistently held that state court action is state action, and 
reaffirmed that holding in a decision that is less than a year 
old. See Tulsa Professional Collections Services, 108 S. Ct. 1340. 
The trial court in the instant case correctly found itself 
bound by the Fourteenth Amendment and refused to infringe upon 
defendant' s constitutional right to decide whether to terminate her 
pregnancy. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT' S DECISION IS CONSISTENT WITH UTAH LAW. 
Plaintiff argues that Utah law with its emphasis on protection 
of the family, children and parental rights somehow mandates that 
the trial court have enjoined the defendant from terminating her 
pregnancy. Brief of Appellant at pp. 7-10 and 23-25. Utah law 
certainly protects parental rights, children and the family, as 
does the federal constitution. Once again, plaintiff s arguments 
presume that life begins at conception and thus the protection that 
Utah affords to parents and children begin when an ovum is 
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fertilized. However, as noted in Point II supra, Roe and Akron 
make it clear that a state may not determine when life begins as a 
matter of law in order to limit a woman' s constitutional right to 
terminate her pregnancy. Thus, Utah law protecting parental 
rights, children and the family does not, and could not 
constitutionally, infringe upon defendant' s right to obtain an 
abortion. 
Moreover, plaintiff ignores the fact that it has been 
established in Utah for over fifteen (15) years that a woman need 
not obtain the consent of a father or her husband to obtain an 
abortion. See Doe v. Rampton 3 66 F. Supp. at 193. In Rampton the 
United States District Court held unconstitutional provisions of a 
Utah law requiring inter alia that a woman be required to obtain 
the consent of her husband and the embryo's father before 
terminating her pregnancy. Id. (invalidating Utah Code Ann. §76-7-
304 (1953 as amended)). At the same time, the court invalidated 
the provisions permitting the husband or father to apply to the 
district court for an injunction to prevent the abortion. Id. 
(invalidating Utah Code Ann. §76-7-316). 
Utah has not reenacted the statutory provisions found 
unconstitutional in Rampton. Instead, the state legislature has 
been satisfied with the Utah law requiring that a woman' s spouse 
receive notification of the woman's choice to terminate her 
pregnancy. Utah Code Ann. §76-7-304 (1978). The validity of that 
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statute is not at issue in this proceeding, as the plaintiff 
7 
obviously had notice of defendant' s pending abortion. 
Plaintiff concludes that the right to notice is the equivalent 
to the right to seek to enjoin the abortion, querying: "For what 
possible purpose did the legislature require notification of the 
husband, unless it is so he may take a role on the decision, 
resorting to the courts if necessary. . . . " Brief of Appellant at 
pp. 7-8. Plaintiff underestimates the legislatures ability to be 
explicit. The law stricken by the court in Rampton specifically 
provided for resort to the courts to enjoin a pending abortion. No 
such provision accompanies Utah- s notice statute. Moreover, if the 
right to notice is the equivalent of the right to enjoin, the Utah 
notice statute would be effectively identical to that stricken in 
Rampton and would be guilty of the same constitutional infirmities, 
a result that the legislature could not have intended when it 
enacted the law in 1974, one year after the United States District 
Court announced its decision in Rampton. 
Plaintiff cites no authority for the proposition that the 
right to notice is equivalent to the right to enjoin. In fact, in 
upholding a notice statute against constitutional challenge, one 
court has noted that such statutes are small concessions in that 
they give a husband only "the right to know that his wife is 
considering an abortion." Scheinberg v. Smith, 659 F. 2d 476, 485 
(5th Cir. 1981). Thus, reading the Utah notice statute against 
However, contrary to what the plaintiff would have this 
court believe, notice statutes similar to Utah' s have not been 
universally upheld. See e.g. Eubanks v. Brown, 604 F. Supp. 141, 148 
(D. Kenn. 1984); Planned Parenthood of Rhode Island v. Board of 
Medical Review, 598 F. Supp. 625, 634 (D.R.I. 1984). 
- 24 -
the background of prior Utah law and in accord with the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit7 s interpretation of a 
similar statute, it is apparent that the right to notice is not the 
equivalent of the right to enjoin. The right to notice granted by 
Utah law simply gives a spouse the right to know of a pending 
abortion. At that point, the spouse may well have a role in making 
the decision, but that role will be at a private level, without 
interference from the court or any other arm of the state, as 
should be all decisions on procreation through, at least, the end 
of the first trimester of pregnancy. 
No Utah law entitles a husband to enlist the power of the 
court if he is unable to convince his wife to continue her 
pregnancy and any such law would run afoul of the Supreme Court' s 
decisions in Roe v. Wade, Akron and Danforth and the United States 
District Court' s decision in Rampton. Consequently, the trial 
court' s decision in the instant case is consistent with Utah law. 
POINT V. 
A MAN MAY NOT FORCE HIS WIFE TO BEAR A CHILD 
TO FURTHER HIS DESIRE TO BECOME A PARENT. 
The Plaintiff argues that denying him the right to veto his 
wife's decision to have an abortion would frustrate a purpose of 
marriage, specifically the purpose of bearing children. Brief of 
Appellant at pp. 19-22. That is simply not the case. A married 
couple may have children when they agree to do so. Thus, bearing 
children remains a purpose of marriage, if both parties desire to 
become parents. The purpose of child-bearing in a marriage extends 
no further privilege than the right to consensual procreation. 
There is no realistic argument that a woman can force her husband 
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to do what it takes for her to bear a child; nor can a man force 
his wife to bear his child. As the Supreme Court has held: 
[T]he marital couple is not an independent entity with a 
mind and heart of its own, but an association of two 
individuals each with a separate intellectual and emo-
tional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, 
it is the right of the individual, married or single, to 
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into 
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the 
decision whether to bear or beget a child. 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
Thus, the Supreme Court has made it clear that the decision to 
have children belongs to each individual, notwithstanding their 
spouse's wishes. If parties do not agree on that decision, the 
courts cannot compel the unwilling spouse to bear children to 
fulfill the other spouse's desire. If a person's decision not to 
bear children frustrates the purpose that their spouse entered into 
the marriage, the offended spouse may do just what the plaintiff 
did in this case, resort to the courts to end the marriage in 
hopes of finding a marriage partner whose feelings about parenthood 
are more consistent with his or her own. 
POINT VI. 
THE "BALANCING TEST" ADVOCATED BY 
THE PLAINTIFF IS INHERENTLY DANGEROUS. 
In his brief, plaintiff repeatedly argues, in essence, that he 
was unjustly denied the ability to have his rights weighed against 
the defendant' s right to terminate her pregnancy because he had a 
genuine interest in the embryo and desired to raise the child into 
which it could develop, relieving defendant of any responsibility 
therefore. Brief of Appellant at pp. 10-12, 12-15 22-23, 29 and 
30. Indeed, plaintiff s affidavit in support of his Ex-Parte 
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Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and plaintiff's Complaint 
for divorce proclaim these noble aspirations. However, actions 
speak louder than words. Plaintiff's conduct throughout his 
pending divorce proceeding has demonstrated that he lacks either 
the ability or the desire to fulfill his aspirations. In his 
Complaint for divorce, plaintiff also sought custody of the parties 
two-year-old son. Temporary custody was awarded to the defendant. 
Plaintiff has been consistently late paying child support and has 
succeeded in convincing the court to reduce the amount of child 
support he pays from $300. 00 per month to $150. 00, which is less 
than the amount necessary to support a child at minimum subsistence 
levels according to the 1986 U.S. Poverty Guidelines 51 Fed. Reg. 
5105-5106 (February 11, 1986). 8 Moreover, he has refused to pay 
his proportionate share of the cost of obtaining a child custody 
evaluation (although he was ordered to do so some four (4) months 
before the date that he claims to have become unemployed). 
There is no reason to assume that the plaintiff would have 
taken greater interest in supporting the child that defendant may 
have born than he has taken in the parties' son. In fact, defen-
dant' s Verified Counterclaim for divorce indicates that plaintiff 
never did have an interest in the embryo. It was plaintiff who 
made the appointment to abort the pregnancy. Only after the 
defendant left the plaintiff did he express a desire to enjoin the 
abortion, a desire that was more likely based on his wish to harass 
Q 
Assuming that plaintiff genuinely desired to relieve the 
defendant of her post-natal obligations to the child, there is no 
mechanism under Utah law that allows plaintiff to succeed in his 
desire. Absent adoption by a third party, both parents remain 
financially responsible for their offspring. 
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the defendant than his wish to take on the responsibilities of 
fatherhood. 
Consequently, had the trial court weighed plaintiff's inter-
ests, as those interests appear in his affidavits, and allowed 
plaintiff to enjoin defendant from terminating her pregnancy, 
defendant would have spent seven months pregnant with minimal, 
irregular, support from plaintiff and would now have an infant and 
a two-year-old under the same adverse financial constraints. The 
injustice in that result is magnified in the instant case by the 
fact that the defendant is only nineteen years old. Thus, had the 
court adopted plaintiff's "balancing approach" and enjoined the 
defendant' s abortion, she would be facing the tremendous obstacle 
of trying to develop a career with no advanced education, two small 
children and very little financial help, a road that leads as 
likely to poverty as to any other end. 
In short, while the balancing test advocated by the plaintiff 
may appear ultimately fair, the risks to the woman involved are 
staggering. Faced with the need to weigh the parties' interests 
quickly, a trial court may incorrectly conclude that a father 
sincerely wishes to take on the responsibilities of parenthood. 
When that conclusion is incorrect, the woman is faced, at minimum, 
with the difficulties inherent in being pregnant and bearing a 
child without significant support. In addition, the woman must 
make the difficult decision of placing for adoption the child she 
has born or rearing the child with insufficient resources. The 
magnitude of the burden placed upon a woman faced with these 
adversities was part of the impetus for the Court' s determination 
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that the woman' s right to terminate her pregnancy is a fundamental 
right protected by the United States Constitution. See Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. at 153. Those burdens are no less bearable when 
they are the result of a third parties' acclaimed interest in the 
embryo. In short, the danger of unjustly burdening a woman with 
an unwanted pregnancy and an unplanned child, renders the "balanc-
ing test" advocated by the plaintiff disproportionately perilous 
for a pregnant woman. 
POINT VII. 
ROE V. WADE HAS NOT BEEN REVERSED. 
Plaintiff ends his appeal with arguments that he believes 
justify reversal of Roe v. Wade. Plaintiff properly stops short 
of requesting that this court issue a decision reversing Roe and, 
of course, this is not a proper forum to render such a decision. 
Furthermore, less than six months ago, the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari on a case factually and legally identical to the instant 
case. See Conn v. Conn, 526 N. E. 2d 958 (Ind. 1988) cert denied 109 
S Ct 391 (1988), indicating that, if the Court is inclined to 
reverse Roe, it does not wish to do so m the instant context. On 
January 9, 1989, the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction over 
the appeal of Missouri v. Reproductive Health Services. At issue 
in that case is a Missouri statute that was enacted to severely 
restrict the right to abortion. Whether the Court will reverse or 
restrict Roe is, at this time, an unknown. The fact remains that 
Roe and its progeny still govern the instant action and the 
precedent announced in those cases bind this court to uphold the 
trial court' s ruling. 
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POINT VIII. 
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES. 
Plaintiff s arguments run directly contrary to well establi-
shed Supreme Court precedent that governs the issue on appeal in 
the instant case. Moreover, the financial declaration filed by 
plaintiff with this Court indicates that plaintiff s gross monthly 
income is $1,492. 80, while that income has allegedly been cut 
substantially, to $201.00 per week by unemployment, plaintiffs 
income still exceeds the income that defendant receives as a part-
time grocery clerk earning $4. 35 an hour. Thus, defendant is 
entitled to an award of attorneys' fees both under Rule 33 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3. 
CONCLUSION 
The United States Supreme Court has held that no third party 
can veto the decision, reached by a woman and her physician, to 
terminate a pregnancy during the first trimester. In accord with 
that holding, no law, state or federal, gives a husband or father 
the right to enjoin a woman from terminating her first trimester 
pregnancy. Consequently, the trial court' s order, refusing to 
issue a preliminary injunction enjoining defendant from obtaining 
an abortion, should be affirmed and defendant should be awarded her 
costs and attorneys' fees for this appeal. 
DATED this 18th day of January, 1989. 
COHNE# RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
MICHAEL S. EVANS 
JULIE A. BRYAN 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the / y day of January, 1989, I 
caused to be hand delivered four (4) true and correct copies of the 
foregoing to the following: 
Mitchell R. Barker 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692 
(td/jab/reynold) 
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E X H I B I T "A" 
Evan R. Hurst, # 5091 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692 
Telephone (801)486-9636 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL JON REYNOLDS, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JENNIFER FRANKS REYNOLDS, 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFF"S AFFIDAVIT 
Civil No. D-88-
Judge 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Having been duly sworn, Plaintiff deposes and states as 
follows: 
1. I am the Plaintiff in the above-entitled matter. 
2. The facts herein stated are based on my knowledge and 
personal observations. 
3. I have been married to the Defendant since November 7, 
1986-
4* My wife is now approximately two and one half (2 1/2) 
months pregnant with my child. 
5. My wife is in good health and previously had a child 
without any extraordinary risks to her health. 
- 1 -
6. I have been with my wife to the doctor and know of no 
extraordinary risks to her health which exist or could arise 
should she carry this child full term. 
7. I am at this time commencing an action for divorce from 
my wife. In this action I am seeking custody of my unborn child. 
8. The allegations in the complaint for divorce are true and 
correct. 
9. The Defendant informed me on March 19, 1988 that she 
would have an abortion performed to kill my unborn child. On 
information and belief I believe that the Defendant will go in to 
have the abortion performed at 11:00 a.m. today (March 22, 1988). 
10. If the Defendant has this abortion, I will suffer 
immediate/ irreparable and permanant injury for which there is no 
relief available in law, equity or otherwise. 
Dated this 22nd day of March, 1988 
Michael Jon Reynolds, Plaintiff' 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 22nd day of 
March, 1988. 
Notary public residing In Salt 
Lake County 
My commission expires: 
\-2 1- ?f 
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E X H I B I T 
MICHAEL S. EVANS, #1015 
LEGAL AID SOCIETY OF SALT LAKE 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
225 SOUTH 200 EAST, SUITE 230 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
TELEPHONE: 328-8849 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL JON REYNOLDS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JENNIFER FRANKS REYNOLDS, 
Defendant. 
ANSWER AND 
) VERIFIED COUNTERCLAIM 
> Civil No. D-88-944 
) Judge 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Jennifer Franks Reynolds, by and through her 
attorney, Michael S. Evans, Legal Aid Society of Salt Lake, and answers 
Plaintiff's Complaint, as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
1. Plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may 
be granted. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
2. Answering Paragraphs 1, 2, 4, 10, 13 and 21 of Plaintiff's 
Complaint, the Defendant admits the allegations contained therein. 
3. Answering Paragraphs 5, 6, 8, 9, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 22 
of Plaintiff's Complaint, the Defendant denies the allegations contained 
therein. 
4. Answering Paragraph 3 of Plaintiff1s Complaint, the Defendant 
admits that there has been one child born as issue of the marriage but 
denies the due date of another child expected and alleges that said due date 
is in November, 1988. 
5. Answering Paragraph 7 of Plaintifffs Complaint, the Defendant 
admits the desire to have an operation performed to abort the unborn child 
of the Plaintiff but denies the remainder of said Paragraph. 
6. Answering Paragraph 11 of Plaintiff's Complaint, the Defendant 
admits that they have acquired certain items of personal property during the 
course of their marriage but denies the remainder of said Paragraph. 
7. Answering Paragraph 12 of Plaintiff's Complaint, the Defendant 
admits that the Plaintiff should assume and pay the credit union debt in the 
approximate amount of $1,600.00 which debt Plaintiff occurred prior to the 
marriage but denies the remainder of said Paragraph 
8. Defendant denies any and all allegations not specifically hereto-
fore admitted. 
WHEREFORE, having fully answered Plaintiff's Complaint, Defendant prays 
that Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed with prejudice and that relief be 
granted as prayed in her Counterclaim set forth herein. 
COUNTERCLAIM 
Defendant counterclaims against the Plaintiff and alleges as follows: 
Provisions Relating to Jurisdiction 
1. Both Plaintiff and Defendant are bona fide residents of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, and have been for three months immediately prior to 
the filing of this action. 
2. The parties maintained their marital domicile in the State of Utah 
at the time the claim arose and/or the acts complained of by the Defendant 
were committed by the Plaintiff in the State of Utah and therefore this 
Court has long-arm jurisdiction over the Plaintiff pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78-27-24-(c), (1953) as amended. 
3. Plaintiff and Defendant were married on November 7, 1986, at Salt 
Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah and are presently married. 
Provisions Relating to Grounds 
4. During the course of the marriage the parties have experienced 
difficulties that cannot be reconciled that have prevented the parties from 
pursuing a viable marriage relationship. 
Provisions Relating to Child Custody and Visitation 
5. There has been one child born as issue of this marriage, to wit: 
ZACHARI REYNOLDS, born June 3, 1987. 
6. The Defendant is a fit and proper person to be awarded the 
permanent care, custody ana control of the minor child of the parties, 
subject to the Plaintiff's right to visit with the child at reasonable 
times and places to include: alternate weekends so long as Plaintiff's 
other child is not present and no overnight visitation until the minor child 
reaches the age of two (2) years of age. 
Provisions Relating to Support Payments 
7. It is reasonable and proper that the Plaintiff be ordered to pay to 
the Defendant a sum of not less than $500.00 per month as support for the 
minor child of the parties. If the Plaintiff becomes delinquent in his 
child support obligation, in an amount at least equal to child support 
payable for one month, then the Defendant should be entitled to mandatory 
income withholding relief pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-45d-l, £t seq. 
(1953) as amended. This income withholding procedure shall apply to 
existing and future payors. All withheld income shall be submitted to the 
Office of Recovery Services, P.O. Box 45011, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84145-0011, until such time as the Plaintiff no longer owes child support to 
the Defendant. 
Provisions Relating to Alimony 
8. Neither party should be awarded alimony. 
Provisions Relating to Real Property 
9. The parties acquired no real property during the course of this 
marriage, nor do they presently own an interest in real property. 
Provisions Relating to Personal Property 
10. During the course of the marriage relationship, the parties have 
acquired personal property. Said personal property of the parties should be 
distributed as follows: 
(a) To the Plaintiff: stereo, waterbed, and his personal effects 
and belongings; 
(b) To the Defendant: couch acquired during the marriage 
together with her personal effects and belongings and clothing and those of 
the minor child; 
(c) All remaining personal property should be awarded to each 
of the parties as they have heretofore divided it. 
Provisions Relating to Debts and Obligations 
11. The Plaintiff should be ordered to assume and pay, and hold 
Defendant harmless from liability on, any and all debts and obligations 
incurred by the parties prior to their date of separation, March 19, 1988 
including, but not limited to the following: Mountain Bell, Plaintiff's 
Credit Union debts, Interwest Speciality, Utah Power and Light Company, 
Mountain Fuel and TCI Cable. Thereafter, it is reasonable and proper that 
the Plaintiff be required to assume and pay all debts and obligations 
incurred for a family purpose. Otherwise, all debts and obligations 
contracted by the parties should be the responsibility of the party who 
incurred the particular debt. 
Provisions Relating to Health Insurance 
12. It is reasonable and proper that each party be required to maintain 
in effect a policy of dental, health and accident insurance, at all times 
that such may be available through their respective employers at reasonable 
cost, with the minor child of the parties as named beneficiary thereunder. 
Further, each party should pay one-half (%) of any deductible amounts and 
one-half (%) of all non-covered medical and dental expenses for said minor 
child. If neither party is able to secure said insurance, each party should 
be responsible for the payment of one-half (%) of all reasonable and 
necessary medical and dental expenses for the minor child. 
Provisions Relating to Life Insurance 
13. The Plaintiff currently has in force and effect a life insurance 
policy on his life in the face amount of $54,000.00. It is fair and 
reasonable that Plaintiff be ordered to maintain in full force and effect 
said life insurance until such time as the parties1 minor child reaches the 
age of eighteen (18). During such period, the Plaintiff should be ordered 
to irrevocably designate the Defendant, as trustee for the minor child, 
beneficiary on said life insurance policy. 
Provisions Relating to Attorneyys Fees and Costs 
14. It has been necessary for the Defendant to secure the services of 
an attorney to represent her in this action and it is reasonable that the 
Plaintiff be required to pay the Defendantfs attorney's fees, in the sum of 
not less than $150.00, if this matter is uncontested, together with all 
Court costs. 
In the event that the matter is contested, the Plaintiff should pay 
an additional reasonable sum as may be deemed appropriate. 
Miscellaneous Provisions 
15. Each party should be ordered to execute and deliver to the other 
such documents as are required to implement the provisions of the Decree of 
Divorce entered by the Court. 
16. The Plaintiff should be permanently restrained from bothering, 
harassing, annoying, threatening, or harming the Defendant at her place of 
residence, employment or any other place. 
17. The Court should grant such other and further relief as it may deem 
just and appropriate in this matter. 
Provisions for Temporary Relief 
18. The Defendant is a fit and proper person to be awarded the 
temporary care, custody and control of the parties1 minor child subject 
to the Plaintiff1s right to reasonable visitation to include: alternate 
weekends so long as Plaintiff's other child is not present and no overnight 
visitation until the minor child reaches the age of two (2) years of age. 
19. Since the Defendant has little income with which to support herself 
and the parties1 minor child, it is reasonable and proper that the 
Plaintiff be ordered to pay to the Defendant a sum of not less than $500.00 
per month as support for the minor child of the parties. If the 
Plaintiff becomes delinquent in his child support obligation, in an amount 
at least equal to child support payable for one month, then the Defendant 
should be entitled to mandatory income withholding relief pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-45d-l, et_ seq. (1953) as amended. This income withholding 
procedure shall apply to existing and future payors. All withheld income 
shall be submitted to the Office of Recovery Services, P.O. Box 45011, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84145-0011, until such time as the Plaintiff no longer owes 
child support to the Defendant. 
20. The Plaintiff has physically abused or threatened physical abuse on 
several occasions the mpst recent being February, 1988. Such conduct by the 
Plaintiff constitutes a threat of immediate and irreparable harm to the 
Defendant. Therefore, the Plaintiff should be restrained from bothering, 
harassing, annoying, threatening, or harming the Defendant at her place of 
residence, employment or any other place. 
21. It is fair and reasonable that the Plaintiff be ordered to maintain 
as current, and hold the Defendant harmless from liability on, all debts, 
payments and obligations of the parties during the pendency of this action. 
22. It is fair and reasonable that the Plaintiff be ordered to maintain 
all present dental, health and medical coverage for the benefit of the 
Defendant and the parties' minor child, and to provide the Defendant with 
any necessary forms and information to effect continued coverage. 
23. That since the birth of the parties minor child on June 3, 1987, 
she has been primarily responsible for the care of said minor child. 
24. That Plaintiff has cared for said minor child without assistance 
very infrequently, never overnight, and has demonstrated an inability to 
adequately care for said minor child without assistance. 
25. That Plaintiff's employment requires he work seven consecutive 
days, take two days off, again work seven consecutive days, etc. which 
effectively prevents him from acting as custodial parent. 
26. That it is in the best interests of the parties minor child that 
his care, custody and control be awarded to Defendant during the pendency of 
this action. 
27. That Defendant is presently in the seventh week of pregnancy. 
28. That not only has Plaintiff been notified of Defendant's intention 
to terminate her pregnancy, but met with her physician and scheduled the 
appointment for her pregnancy to be terminated. 
29. That Plaintiff knew well in advance of her scheduled appointment 
but intentionally delayed seeking and serving her with a Temporary 
Restraining Order from proceeding, until the morning of her appointment 
which caused her extreme emotional distress and suffering, 
30. That Plaintiff, by his actions in this matter, has demonstrated a 
complete disregard for her emotional and physical well-being and has 
violated her constitutionally protected right to privacy in adopting a 
position totally unsupported by the law. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays that a divorce be granted pursuant to the 
terms set forth in this Counterclaim and that the Ex Parte Temporary 
Restraining Order restraining Defendant from proceeding to terminate her 
pregnancy be vacated forthwith. 
DATED this Jg* day of ffllhtM 1988. 
LEGAL AID SOCIETY OF SALT LAKE 
ML 
MICHAEL S. EVANS 
Attorney for Defendant 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
JENNIFER FRANKS REYNOLDS, being first duly sworn upon her oath, deposes 
and says that she is the Defendant in the above-entitled action; that she 
has read the foregoing Answer and Verified Counterclaim, and understands the 
contents thereof, and the same is true of her own knowledge, information and 
belief. 
JENNIFER^FRANKB T C E Y N O L D S I 
m WAZJ SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 29 day of ///MO( , 1988. 
Jbm/ J 
NJ0TARYPUBLIC 
esiding in SaltxLake County 
My Commission Expires: 
MIJ6M 
CERTIFICATE OF 
7* . * fit f ,„«„ , ^ v ? QsLiy&tet\ 
On this 29 day of //(M,/ 1988, I rtnprmtnri lu tun UulLad 
Stateo—Maiir—pootago—prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Answer and Verified Counterclaim to Evan R. Hurst, Attorney for Plaintiff, 
at 2870 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692. 
A 
E X H I B I T "C 
\ i 1 
Evan R. Hurst, t 5091 
Mitchell R. Barker # 4530 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692 
Telephone (801)486-9636 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL JON REYNOLDS, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JENNIFER FRANKS REYNOLDS, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
RESTRAINING ORDER 
Civil No. D-88-
Judge T V ^ $ YoofltA 
SUMMARY OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Plaintiff and defendant are husband and wife, having been 
married November 7, 1986. The parties have one child by their 
marriage. Late last year or early this year, the parties 
conceived another child while in the usual course of marriage. 
The parties are now estranged, and neither party wishes to 
continue the marriage. Defendant has expressed a desire to abort 
plaintiff's child that she is carrying. Plaintiff is very much 
opposed to termination of the parties' child, and intends to 
take custody of the child when it is born. Obviously, if 
defendant is not restrained from obtaining an abortion, the child 
will never be born. Defendant is in good health and this 
pregnancy poses no extraordinary risks to her health. 
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EXHIBIT "c1 
ARGUMENT 
1. Fathers' Rights in their unborn children have not been 
extensively litigated. 
The law concerning rights of fathers of unborn children is 
very unsettled. There are very few cases dealing with the issues 
raised by this case. Most existing case law is inapplicable. 
Virtually all abortion cases deal with governmental restrictions 
on the rights of women to obtain abortions. This case is 
distinguishable because it involves a private individual, the 
father of the child, seeking to restrain another private 
individual, the mother, from obtaining an abortion. Previous 
cases concerning spousal consent statutes were not fathers1 
rights cases but were cases involving governmental attempts to 
use fathers1 rights as a conduit to regulate abortion. 
2. The Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Danforth lines of 
cases are inapplicable. 
By their terms, the Constitutional Amendments which have been 
used to curtail governmental regulation of abortion apply only to 
the State and not to private individuals. The Fourteenth 
Amendment starts the prohibitive sections with the phrase "no 
state shall. . . . " The Constitution rarely if ever acts to 
Jetermine the interests of one private party as against 
encroachment by another private party. Laws are enacted pursuant 
o the Constitution to protect private parties from encroachment 
y other private parties, but Congress has taken no such action 
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as regarding the rights of husbands and wives with respect to 
abortion. The limited actions Utah's legislature have taken 
favor the rights of Mr. Reynolds here. 
3. Giving one party absolute control over an interest shared 
with another party solely on the basis of status, without regard 
to the motives and intentions of the parties is inequitable* 
State abortion statutes which attempt to give a husband veto 
power over his wife's abortion decisions regardless of reasons or 
intentions have been uniformly stricken down. Planned Parenthood 
of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 49 
L.Ed.2. 788 (1976). Conversely, that same unilateral power, not 
limited by intentions or reasons, should not be granted a woman 
in her abortion decision when she faces opposition from her 
husband, especially when he is the interested father of the 
child. To find that a father can have no interest in his unborn 
child, particularly when he is married to the mother and the 
pregnancy resulted from a mutually consensual act, would be 
utterly ridiculous. The Supreme Court of the United States has 
found a protected right to procreate. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 
316 U.S. 535, 86 L.Ed. 1655, 62 S.Ct. 1110 (1942). 
The right to an abortion is premised on privacy rights. It 
is doubtful a right to privacy exists as between spouses 
concerning the destruction of part of the fully anticipated 
products of the marriage. The right or interests of the father 
are recognized by the state of Utah in its abortion statute, UCA 
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76-7-304, where notification of a married woman's husband, if 
possible, is required before she can have an abortion performed. 
The legislature must have intended the husband be given consent 
because the husband had an interest and, depending on the 
circumstances, a say in the decision. 
It should be noted that here we have a husband desirous of 
custody of the child, and willing to adopt to relieve Mrs. 
Reynolds of her liability. See affidavit of Mike Reynolds. 
Conversely, Mrs. Reynolds has waffled on whether she will abort 
the child, and has stated that her decision to do so was because 
she did not want to carry any child that was Mr. Reynolds1 (not 
that she did not want to be pregnant). Id. 
Also, as the conception of a child incurs liability for a 
husband, the act should logically also vest some right in him. 
As both parties have interests in conflict here, their interests 
must be balanced. 
4. Current abortion procedure, including defendant's actions in 
this case, pays only lip service to the instructions in Roe v. 
Wade. 
The decision of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 
L.Ed.2d. 147 (1973), gives the following factors that a woman and 
her responsible physician will "necessarily consider" in 
consultation in making the abortion decision. 
Specific and direct harm medically diagnosable even in 
early pregnancy may be involved. Maternity, or 
additional offspring, may force upon the woman a 
distressful life and future. Pschological harm may be 
- 4 -
imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by 
child care. There is also the distress, for all 
concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and 
there is the problem of bringing a child into a family 
already unable, psychologically and otherwise, to care 
for it. In other cases, as in this one, the additional 
difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood 
may be involved. Roe v. Wade at 410 U.S. 153. 
Many of these factors are negated by the presence of a father who 
desires the child and is willing to not impose any postnatal 
duties upon the mother. There are no medical problems in this 
case which warrant abortion. In fact, defendant's original 
doctor found no medical problems and declined to perform an 
abortion. It was at that time that defendant sought out a 
phsyician who specializes in performing abortions. With 
physicians whose livelihoods depend on performing abortions, one 
could very easily question whether the consultations called for 
in Roe v. Wade actually and meaningfully take place. Plaintiff, 
as the father, is a person who is affected by defendant's 
abortion decision. In this case he seeks to provide his input so 
that the consultation envisioned by Roe v. Wade occur in 
actuality and not just as a meaningless formality to mask 
"abortion on demand". 
5. Granting the restraining order in this case will best 
preserve the expectations and rights of the parties. 
The unborn child in this case resulted from an act of 
intimacy between the parties while in the bonds of marriage. A 
major expectation of marriage is the procreation of children. 
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The parties have a previous child, so both parties were aware of 
the possible consequences of their actions. In fact, as stated 
in Mr. Reynolds' affidavit, Mrs. Reynolds desired to abort the 
parties' now living child. When Mr. Reynolds objected she 
acquiesced, apparently acknowledging that as father he has an 
interest and voice in the decision. 
Now the parties are contemplating divorce, a part of which 
process is the division of the products of the marriage. Real 
and personal property acquired during marriage will be divided. 
Custody of the already born child of the parties will be 
determined. Plaintiff now asks for some consideration as to the 
expectancy he has in this unborn (inchoate) child, considered 
property or issue. Defendant has very clearly expressed that she 
does not want the child. If an abortion is allowed, defendant 
will receive her full expectations, while plaintiff will be 
denied his expectation in its entirety. If the child is allowed 
to be born and then given into plaintiff's custody, plaintiff 
will receive his expectancy and defendant's expectancy will have 
been postponed only six months, 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
An interest that the father of an unborn child has in that 
child does not derive from the State or from the child. Hence, 
those rights are not bounded by constitutional restrictions on 
State power or lack of status of an unborn child. The rights of 
such a father are strengthened if the child was conceived during 
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marriage, as procreation is an anticipated activity of marriage. 
Granting either parent the unilateral, unbounded power to abort 
or prevent abortion of an unborn child disregards the respective 
rights of the parties. 
There may be some husband/wife abortion conflicts when it 
would be inappropriate to interfere with a wife's decision. But 
under the circumstances, this is clearly not such a case. 
Consideration needs to be given to criteria propounded in Roe v. 
Wade and also to the respective intentions, expectancies and 
motives of the parties. Considering that defendant desires only 
to be rid of plaintiffs baby, and that plaintiff is divorcing 
defendant and wants custody and care of the baby, and also that 
no extra medical risks are presented to defendant by carrying the 
baby full-term, defendant should be restrained from having an 
abortion performed on this child. 
Dated this 28th day of March, 1988 
Evan Hurst, Attorney for 
Plaintiff 
Certificate of Hand Delivery 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Support 
of Restraining Order was hand delivered this 28th day of March, 
1988 to Jennifer Franks Reynolds at 3339 Greenmont Drive, West 
Valley City, Utah. 
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E X H I B I T "D" 
MICHAEL S. EVANS, #1015 
LEGAL AID SOCIETY OF SALT LAKE 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
225 SOUTH 200 EAST, SUITE 230 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
TELEPHONE: 328-8849 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL JON REYNOLDS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JENNIFER FRANKS REYNOLDS, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS 
AND AUTHORITIES 
Civil No. D-88-944 
Judge 
COMES NOW the Defendant by and through her attorney of record, Michael 
S. Evans, Legal Aid Society of Salt Lake and submits this Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities in support of her objection to Plaintiff's Order to 
Show Cause. 
QUESTION PRESENTED 
Can a third party prevent a woman from voluntarily terminating her 
pregnancy? 
It is clear that under Roe v. Wade and its progeny, any third party 
veto power over a woman's decision to terminate a pregnancy is 
constitutionally invalid. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were married November 7, 1986 in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
During their brief marriage they have experienced repeated marital 
difficulties and have separated several times. When the Defendant learned 
that she was pregnant, she and the Plaintiff decided to terminate the 
pregnancy. The Plaintiff accompanied the Defendant to her doctor's office 
where the matter was fully discussed* He later made the appointment at the 
Utah Women's Health Center for the procedure, on behalf of the Defendant. 
Defendant was served with a Divorce Complaint and a Temporary 
Restraining Order to prevent her from terminating the pregnancy, on the 
morning of March 22, 1988 as she was leaving for her appointment at the Utah 
Women's Health Center. Defendant is toward the end of her first trimester 
where the procedure could easily be performed with safety. Plaintiff has 
demonstrated an utter disregard for the Defendant's health and emotional 
well-being as well as her legal rights by his conduct. 
DISCUSSION 
Title 76, Chapter 7 of the Utah Code Annotated regulates abortion. 
Section 76-7-304, CONSIDERATION BY PHYSICIAN - NOTICE TO MINOR'S PARENTS OR 
MARRIED WOMAN'S HUSBAND reads in pertinent part: 
To enable the physician to exercise his best medical 
judgment, he shall: 
(2) Notify, if possible, the parents . . . of the 
women upon whom the abortion is to be performed, if 
she is a minor or the husband of the woman, if she 
is married. 
The statutory language should be read plainly on its- face. The 
.provision addresses notification, not consent. Therefore, under the Code 
the Plaintiff is entitled only to be notified of the Defendant's choice to 
have an abortion. The facts of the case make it clear that the Plaintiff 
knows of the Defendants decision. He attended a counseling session 
involving the Defendant and her personal physician, Dr. Glade Curtis, where 
the subject was discussed. Furthermore, he made the appointment for the 
procedure at the Utah WomenTs Health Center for the Defendant. Finally, he 
has sought help from the Court in preventing the Defendant from exercising 
her choice. 
Any attempt to interpret Section 76-7-304 as containing an implied 
spousal consent to a pregnancy termination as opposed to mere notification 
is disingenuous and flies in the face of both legislative and case law 
history. The only consent provision requirement regarding abortion in the 
Code is contained in Section 76-7-305. It reads in pertinent part: 
(1) No abortion may be performed unless a voluntary 
and informed written consent is first obtained by 
the attending physician from the woman upon whom the 
abortion is to be performed. 
This provision is consistent with United State Supreme Court rulings on 
the issue. While a State may constitutionally require informed consent from 
the woman upon whom the procedure is to be performed, it may not impose 
other consent restrictions regarding the decision. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113 (1973); Doc v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
An earlier version of the Utah Code, later repealed, which expressly 
required a husband's consent to his wife's abortion was held 
unconstitutional in Doe v. Ramption, 366 F.Supp. 189 (D. Utah 1975), aff'd, 
535 F.2d 1219 (10th Cir. 1975). Section 76-7-304 read at that time: 
. . . (2) If the woman upon whom the abortion is to be 
performed is married at the time of the performance of 
the abortion, such consent must be given by her husband. 
In rejecting this provision, the United States District Court held; 
"Section 76-7-304 is invalid because it subjects the exercise of the 
individual right of privacy of the mother, in all abortions at all stages of 
pregnancy to the consent of others." Doe v. Ramption 394 F.Supp. at 193. 
The United States Supreme Court has clearly established a woman's right 
to terminate a pregnancy without consent of, or against the objections of, 
the child's father. In Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 
U.S. 52 (1976), the Court examined a Missouri Statute, which, similar to 
Utah's earlier Code version, required the prior written consent of the 
spouse of a woman seeking to terminate a pregnancy. While recognizing that 
the decision to undergo an abortion may have profound effects on a marriage, 
the Court nevertheless held that "• . . the State cannot have the 
constitutional authority to give the spouse the unilateral ability to prohibit 
the wife from terminating her pregnancy, when the State itself lacks that 
right." I^d at 70. See also Eisenatadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
Cases in which a constitutionally permissible form of notice 
requirement may indirectly impact on a woman fs choice to have an abortion 
are distinguishable. For instance, certain parental notice requirements 
where minors seek to terminate a pregnancy have been upheld. E^ - J^ . v. 
Wilkinson, 639 F.Supp 952 (D. Utah 1986); E. - L^ v. Matheson, 604, P.2d 907 
(Utah 1979), 101 S.Ct. 1164 (1981). 
Despite the potentially aaverse impact these restrictions may have upon 
the choice to terminate, they were upheld in part because they did not vest 
with the parents a blanket power to veto the minor!s choice to abort. H. -
L^ . v. Matheson, 101 S.Ct at 1166. Furthermore, such cases are 
distinguishable because they involve either immature, dependant, or 
unemancipated minors who sometimes lack the ability to make fully informed 
choices. 
The Defendant in this case is an 18 year old married woman who has 
already given her fully informed consent to have the procedure performed. 
SUMMARY 
It is clear that under Roe v. Wade and its progeny, any unilateral 
third party veto power over a woman's decision to terminate a pregnancy is 
constitutionally invalid. In Danforth the Court struck down a spousal 
consent requirement. To interpret Utah's Notice Statute as a consent 
provision is to ignore 15 years of both State and Federal case law. The 
only constitutional choice to be made on the present facts of this case is 
to permit the Defendant to exercise her right to privacy in whatever way she 
and her physician deem best. 
DATED this 20' day of ffifaf 1988. 
LEGAL AID SOCIETY OF SALT LAKE 
M. 
MICHAEL S. EVANS KATHERINE FOX 
Attorney for Defendant Legal Intern for Michael S. Evans 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
On this 29* day of //)M/A » 1988, I deposited hand-delivered, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities to Evan R. Hurst, Attorney for Plaintiff, at 2870 South State 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692. 
David S. Dolowitz (0899) 
Julie A. Bryan (4805) 
of and for 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
525 East 100 South 
Fifth Floor 
P O Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Attorneys for defendant and the 
American Civil Liberties Union 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL JON REYNOLDS, 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ; 
JENNIFER FRANKS REYNOLDS, ] 
Defendant. ] 
> MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
1 AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
1 DEFENDANT' S OBJECTION TO AND 
1 MOTION TO VACATE TEMPORARY 
) RESTRAINING ORDER AND ORDER 
TO SHOW CAUSE 
Civil No. D88-944 
Judge David Young 
Defendant respectfully submits this Memorandum in Support of 
her Objection to and Motion to Vacate the Temporary Restraining 
Order. 
FACTS 
The defendant, Jennifer Franks Reynolds ("Defendant") is an 
18 year old woman. She has been married to the plaintiff, 
Michael Jon Reynolds ("Plaintiff"), since November 7, 1986, less 
than 18 months. A child was born to the parties on June 3, 
1987. 
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On March 22, 1988, Plaintiff filed a Compliant for Divorce 
in this court. On the same day Plaintiff secured an ex-parte 
Temporary Restraining Order and an Order to Show Cause 
restraining Defendant from terminating her pregnancy, which is 
approximately 10 weeks into the gestational period. The 
Temporary Restraining Order issued by this court forced 
defendant to cancel the appointment she had scheduled with her 
physician to terminate her pregnancy. 
This court issued an Order to Show Cause why the 
Restraining Order should not be made permanent. Defendant herein 
sets forth the points and Authorities in Support of her 
opposition to the Order to Show Cause, which demonstrate that 
this court may not, consistent with the Constitution of the 
United States restrain defendant' s choice as to whether to 
continue her pregnancy. 
ARGUMENT 
JL. THIS COURT' S RESTRAINING ORDER IS A VIOLATION OF 
DEFENDANT' S CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED RIGHT OF PRIVACY. 
Defendant has a constitutionally protected right of privacy 
that encompasses her decision whether or not to terminate her 
pregnancy. Roe v, Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1972); City of Akron 
v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health/ 462 U.S. 416, 419 
(1983). During the first trimester of her pregnancy, defendant's 
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constitutional right prevents any state interference with her 
decision regarding abortion. Roe v. Wade. 410 U. S. at 164. Just 
as the State may not directly interfere with defendant' s 
decision, neither can it "delegate to a spouse a veto power which 
the state itself is absolutely and totally prohibited from 
exercising during the first trimester of pregnancy. M Planned 
Parenthood of Missouri v. Panforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1975) (citing 
392 F. Supp 1362, 1375 (1975)). 
In conjunction with its holding that a State may not 
constitutionally create a right in a husband to veto his wife' s 
decision whether to terminate her pregnancy, the United States 
Supreme Court made it clear that the interest of the pregnant 
woman' s husband or the fetus' purported father does not outweigh 
the woman' s constitutional right to decide whether to terminate 
her pregnancy. The Supreme Court stated: 
" We are not unaware of the deep and proper concern and 
interest that a devoted and protective husband has in his 
wife's pregnancy and m the growth and development of the 
fetus she is carrying. Neither has this Court failed to 
appreciate the importance of the marital relationship in our 
society. Moreover, we recognize that the decision whether 
to undergo or to forego an abortion may have profound 
effects on the future of any marriage, effects that are both 
physical and mental, and possibly deleterious. 
Notwithstanding these factors, we cannot hold that the State 
has the constitutional authority to give the spouse 
unilaterally the ability to prohibit the wife from 
terminating her pregnancy, when the State itself lacks that 
right. 
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It seems manifest that, ideally, the decision to terminate a 
pregnancy should be one concurred in by both the wife and 
her husband. No marriage may be viewed as harmonious or 
successful if the marriage partners are fundamentally 
divided on so important and vital an issue. But it is 
difficult to believe that the goal of fostering mutuality 
and trust in a marriage, and of strengthening the marital 
relationship in the marriage institution, will be achieved 
by giving the husband a veto power exercisable for any 
reason whatsoever or for no reason at all. Even if the 
State had the ability to delegate to the husband a power it 
itself could not exercise, it is not at all likely that such 
action would further, as the District Court majority phrased 
it, the ' interest of the State in protecting the mutuality 
of decisions vital to the marriage relationship. ' 
We recognize, of course, that when a woman, with the 
approval of her physician but without the approval of her 
husband, decides to terminate her pregnancy, it could be 
said that she is acting unilaterally. The obvious fact is 
that when the wife and the husband disagree on this 
decision, the view of only one of the two marriage partners 
can prevail. Inasmuch as it is the woman who physically 
bears the child and who is the more directly and immediately 
affected by the pregnancy, as between the two, the balance 
weighs in her favor." 428 U.S. at 69-71 (citations 
omitted). 
The Court in Danforth held that a State cannot grant a 
husband veto power over a woman' s decision to terminate her 
pregnancy; the woman' s constitutional right to privacy prohibits 
such interference by a third party. Id. 
Other courts have rejected similar attempts by states to 
statutorily limit a woman' s right to abortion during the first 
trimester which were based upon assertions that the state was 
protecting the father' s interests in the fetus. See e. g. , 
Planned Parenthood of Rhode Island v. Bd. of Medical Review, 598 
F. Supp 625, 639 (D. C.R.I. 1984) (husband's right to procreate does 
not outweigh a wife's constitutional right to terminate 
pregnancy); Eubanks v. Brown, 604 F. Supp 141, 148 (W. D. Ky. 
1984)(given the absolute right of the woman to terminate the 
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A state may not statutorily grant a spouse or father the 
right to infringe upon a woman' s constitutional right to privacy, 
when it has no power to so act directly and common law cannot 
abrogate the constitutional protected right. The Maryland Court 
of Special Appeals so held in deciding an issue identical to the 
one before this Court. In Coleman v. Coleman, 57 Md. App. 755, 
471 A. 2d (1984) cert, denied 298 Md. 353, 469 A. 2d 1274 (1984), 
the petitioner sought an order enjoining his wife from 
terminating her pregnancy. The trial court granted a Temporary 
Restraining Order, but dissolved the Temporary Restraining Order 
and denied injunctive relief to the petitioner after a hearing on 
the issue. The petitioner appealed. 
In affirming the trial court's refusal to grant an 
injunction, the Maryland court considered and rejected the 
argument advanced by the plaintiff herein, which is essentially, 
that as the fetus' purported father and the woman' s husband he 
has the right to enjoin his wife from terminating her pregnancy. 
The Coleman court noted that implicit in the petitioners argument 
is the assertion: 
"that he has standing to enjoin the wife from having an 
abortion. The husband has no such standing inasmuch as the 
Supreme Court has determined that a husband' s consent to a 
pregnancy during the first trimester, the state does not have the 
constitutional power to require notification to her husband of 
her decision to terminate her pregnancy. 
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wife's abortion, during the first trimester, is unnecessary, 
[citing D^nfgrth] and any attempt bv a State to confer such 
a statutory right is 'absolutely and totally prohibited . . 
. during the first trimester of pregnancy. ' " 471 A. 2d. at 
1119 [emphasis added]. 
The court held that the petitioner was constitutionally 
prohibited from enjoining his wife from terminating her 
pregnancy. IJL 
In the instant case, as in Coleman, in view of the Supreme 
Court' s decision in Danforth. it is plain that defendant has a 
constitutional right to determine whether to continue her 
pregnancy without interference from the plaintiff. 
Consequently, the defendant requests that the court vacate the 
Temporary Restraining Order and prohibit plaintiff from further 
interfering with the defendant' s decision and actions regarding 
an abortion. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant has a constitutional right to determine whether to 
continue her pregnancy during the first trimester. Neither the 
State nor her husband may veto her decision to terminate the 
pregnancy. Therefore, defendant requests that the court vacate 
the Temporary Restraining Order and prohibit the plaintiff from 
further interfering with her decision on whether to continue her 
pregnancy. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this *2 ^  day of March, 1988. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the 28th day of March, 1988, I 
hand delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing, to : 
Evan R. Hurst 
2870 South State 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692 
Michael Evans 
Legal Aid Society 
225 South 200 East 
#230 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(td/john/reynolds . mem) 
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E X H I B I T "E" 
L> 
MICHAEL S. EVANS, #1015 
LEGAL AID SOCIETY OF SALT LAKE 
CO-COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT 
225 SOUTH 200 EAST, SUITE 230 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
TELEPHONE: 328-8849 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ, #0899 
JULIE A. BRYAN, #4805 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
CO-COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT 
525 EAST 100 SOUTH, FIFTH FLOOR 
P.O. BOX 11008 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84147-0008 
TELEPHONE: 532-2666 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
o 
MICHAEL JON REYNOLDS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JENNIFER FRANKS REYNOLDS, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT 
OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR TEMPORARY RELIEF 
Civil No. D-88-944 
Judge David S. Young 
STATE OF UTAH 
:ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Comes now the above-named Defendant, Jennifer Franks Reynolds, being 
first duly sworn and deposes and says as follows: 
Allegations Regarding Custody and Visitation 
1. That there has been one (1) minor child born as issue of the 
marriage of the parties hereto, to wit: ZACHARI REYNOLDS, born June 3, 
1987. 
2. That since the birth of said minor child, the Defendant has been 
regularly, continuously and solely responsible for the primary care of said 
child until she returned to work in January, 1988. 
3. That since January, 1988 the Defendant has worked not more than 
thirty (30) hours per week and that at the time she is at work her aunt, 
Rose Jones, or her mother have provided the primary care for said minor 
child. 
4. That from the time of said child's birth until the parties hereto 
separated in March, 1988, the Plaintiff's employment prevented him from 
spending much time with the parties minor child, but that even when 
Plaintiff was not at work he provided minimal care for said child, despite 
the Defendant's request that he do so. 
5. That Plaintiff was unemployed for approximately two (2) months in 
late 1987, but still refused to provide anything other than minimal care for 
said child and specifically refused to bathe the minor child and would give 
said minor child a bottle instead of feeding the minor child baby food. 
6. That Plaintiff has never been solely responsible for the minor 
child's primary care for a period of more than seven (7) hours, and then 
only infrequently when the Defendant was at work and the Plaintiff was off 
of work. 
7. That at no time has the Plaintiff been solely responsible for said 
child's care overnight. 
8. That the parties separated several times during their brief 
marriage and that said minor child resided with the Defendant in each of 
those separations. Further, that the Plaintiff voiced no objection to the 
minor child residing with Defendant. 
9. That the parties separated for approximately one (1) month 
commencing July 4, 1987, as a result of physical abuse inflicted on the 
Defendant by the Plaintiff. Further, that during this one (1) month 
separation, Plaintiff refused to provide to the Defendant the child's 
belongings, made no effort to see the child at all for the first week of the 
separation, and visited for a total of two to four hours during the balance 
of the separation. 
10. That since the parties hereto separated on March 19, 1988, 
Plaintiff has visited the parties1 minor child on only three (3) occasions: 
for approximately twenty-five (25) minutes in Defendant's home on Easter 
Day, 1988; and on April 16 and April 23, 1988 from the hours 9:00 a.m. to 
6:00 p.m. 
11. That the Defendant understood Plaintiff was to visit with the 
parties minor child on April 9, 1988, and when he didn't appear the 
Defendant telephoned the Plaintiff to ask why he did not come to the 
visitation to which the Plaintiff replied "I didn't sign any papers and I am 
not your babysitter." 
12. That Plaintiff has advised the Defendant that he cannot visit with 
the parties' minor child on April 30, 1988, as anticipated because such 
visitation would conflict with his work schedule. 
13. That Plaintiff is the known non-custodial parent of another minor 
son and that Plaintiff failed to effect any visitation whatsoever with said 
other minor child from mid-November, 1987 until the end of January, 1988, 
including Thanksgiving and Christmas Day. 
14. That the Defendant is a fit and proper person to be awarded the 
care, custody and control of the parties' minor child during the pendency of 
this action, subject to Plaintiff's rights of reasonable visitation, to 
include daytime visitation only. 
Allegations Regarding Child Support 
15. That the Defendant is employed by Smith's Food King as a clerk at 
the camera bar and is compensated at the rate of $4.45 per hour. 
16. That the number of hours each week varies somewhat, but that the 
Defendant is not allowed to work more than thirty (30) hours in any one 
week. 
17. That her gross income from all sources totals approximately $420.00 
per month. That her average monthly expenses are as follows: 
car payment 
Interwest Specialities 
child care 
food for Zachari 
gas 
clothing for Zachari, including diapers 
automobile insurance 
rent and utilities 
incidentals 
TOTAL 
$100.00 
74.95 
150.00 
75.00 
50.00 
50.00 
44.00 
75.00 
25.00 
$493.95 
18. That the Defendant and the parties1 minor child presently reside 
with her at the Defendant's parents home and pay a minimal amount for 
utilities and rent but that the Defendant desires to obtain a separate 
residence for herself and the parties' minor child as soon as she is 
financially able and that a reasonable housing expense is $400.00 per month. 
19. That since the parties hereto separated on March 19, 1988, the 
Plaintiff has paid the Defendant a total of $150.00 as and for support of 
the parties1 minor child. 
20. That from the information provided in Plaintiff's Affidavit, 
Plaintiff's monthly gross income exceeds $2,300.00. 
21. That in Plaintiff's Affidavit, previously filed herein, he has 
noted a $250.00 per month expense for rent and a $100.00 per month expense 
for utilities, even though he is living with relatives. Further, that 
Plaintiff's Affidavit indicates a monthly expense of $292.91 for a boat 
payment even though said boat payment was made by Plaintiff's mother 
throughout the marriage of the parties hereto. 
22. That Defendant and the minor child are in need of, and Plaintiff 
has declared ability to pay, temporary maintenance in the sum of at least 
$500.00 per month. 
DATED t h i s lA day of AffyL 1988. 
M-
JENNIFER FRANKS REYNOLDS 
Affiant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this «££ day of /jfff/l , 1988, 
a 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in Salt Lake County 
My Commission Expires: 0»2%-rffl 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On this %& day of ^//ffi/Z, > 1988, I deposited in the United 
States Mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Affidavit in Support of Defendant's Motion for Temporary Relief to Evan R. 
Hurst, Mitchell R. Barker, Attorneys for Plaintiff, at 2870 South State 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692, 
E X H I B I T " F" 
Evan R. Hurst, # 5091 
Mitchell R. Barker # 4530 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692 
Telephone (801)486-9636 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT rOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF U 
MICHAEL JON REYNOLDS, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
JENNIFER FRANKS REYNOLDS, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAEL 
JON REYNOLDS 
Civil NO. D-88- *99+'' 
Judge David S. Young 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Having been duly sworn, Michael J- Reynolds deposes and 
states as follows: 
1. I am the Plaintiff in the above-entitled matter. 
2. The facts herein stated are based on my knowledge and 
personal observations. 
3. I have been married to the Defendant since November 7, 
1986. We have a nine month old son and my wife is pregnant with 
another child. My wife wanted to abort our first child, but I 
was able to convince her not to. 
_ I _ 
4. My wife and I are now separated. On March 21, 1988, 
after previously informing me she would have an abortion, my wife 
and her Mother informed me that she would have the baby, quit her 
job, and "really stick it to me" on child support and alimony. I 
did not react to this threat. Later, when they realized that it 
would hurt me more, my wife informed me that she was not going to 
have one more of my children. She has informed me that part of 
the reason she wants an abortion is to get back at me through my 
unborn child. I feel she also wants to avoid any responsibility. 
5. During most of our son's life, I have been the primary 
care-giver of the child. 
6. My wife has been less than adequate as a parent. She 
will not get up earlier than 10:00 to care for the baby. On 
several occasions I have come home from the graveyard shift after 
working two shifts and cared for the baby because my wife would 
not get up to care for him. 
7. Jennifer informed me that last Thursday my wife left our 
nine month old baby with an eleven year old neighbor boy, who is 
a delinquent and has had several problems with the police. My 
wife does not like to spend time with my son but prefers to 
shuttle him between various sitters and relatives. 
8. I have arranged for child care for my children during my 
working hours should I get custody of them. The sitter's name is 
Elaine Robinette. She is a professional child care provider in 
her home. She has provided care for my son from my previous 
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marriage since his infancy. I have considerable confidence in 
her ability to provide quality care for my children when I am 
unable to do so because of work, 
9. Since our separation, my wife has been living with her 
parents. I worry about the safety and welfare of my children in 
that home. My wife's father is a frequent and occasionally heavy 
drinker. This condition has caused problems with some of my 
attempts to visit my son. On several occasions my father-in-law 
has threatened me while drunk. On at least one previous 
occasion, my wife's father has shown great indifference to the 
safety of my son while in a state of intoxication. On that 
occasion, he was trying to get at me to cause me harm, I was 
staying away from him so no one would get hurt and my 
mother-in-law, while holding my baby, was trying to interject 
herslf to calm down her husband. He was pushing her without 
regard to the fact that she had a baby in her arms, 
10. Since our separation Jennifer and her family have allowd 
little visitation, and only at great inconvenience to me. The 
limited visitation allowed was only permitted in her parents1 
home with her father present the entire time. Since this Court 
signed a Temporary Restraining Order I have had no visitation, 
despite repeated efforts. I had made an appointment with 
Jennifer to have visitation today. When Jennifer's family 
received (today) a hand-delivered copy of the memorandum 
submitted by my attornies in support of making the restraining 
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order permanent, her father became angry and said I would need a 
court order to see my son any time from now on. 
11. Even though my wife and I are separated, I have sought 
to maintain contact with my son., This has been difficult because 
of the belligerence of my wife's father. 
12. I believe I am a fit and proper parent to whom custody 
of our minor child, Zachary, should be awarded, subject to 
reasonable visitation in favor of Jennifer. 
13. If Jennifer is concerned about any future child support 
obligation concerning our unborn child, I am willing to adopt 
the child to extinguish any such obligation. 
Dated this 28th day of March, 1988 
Michael JoriJReynolds,j Plainti: 
March, 1988 
ff 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 28th day of 
/ / S i s 
My commission expires: 
Notary public residing in Salt 
Lake County 
_ 4 _ 
E X H I B I T "G" 
a 
MICHAEL S. EVANS, #1015 ^ ^ 
LEGAL AID SOCIETY OF SALT LAKE y 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT -i 
225 SOUTH 200 EAST, SUITE 230 M 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 ^ 
TELEPHONE: 328-8849 ' 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL JON REYNOLDS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JENNIFER FRANKS REYNOLDS, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON ORDER 
> TO SHOW CAUSE 
Civil No, D-88-944 
Judge David S. Young 
Hearing on the Order to Show Cause issued by the above-entitled Court 
was held on Monday, the 2nd day of May, 1988, pursuant to notice, the 
Honorable David S. Young presiding. Plaintiff appeared in person and was 
represented by his attorney, Mitchell R. Barker. Defendant appeared in 
person and was represented by her attorney, Michael S. Evans, Legal Aid 
Society of Salt Lake and Julie A. Bryan, co-counsel for Defendant. The 
Court having heard proffer of testimony and arguments of counsel as to some 
issues, and the Court having approved parties' stipulation as to other 
issues, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, now, therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. That the Defendant is hereby awarded the temporary care, custody 
and control of the parties1 minor child subject to the Plaintiff's right to 
reasonable and liberal visitation to be agreed upon by the parties. 
2. It is reasonable and proper that the Plaintiff be ordered to pay to 
the Defendant a sum of not less than $300.00 per child per month commencing 
on April 1, 1988, as support for the parties' minor child. If the Plaintiff 
becomes delinquent in his child support obligation, in an amount at least 
equal to child support payable for one month, then the Defendant should be 
entitled to mandatory income withholding relief pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-45d-l, ejt^  seq. (1953) as amended, and any Federal and State tax refunds 
or rebates due the Plaintiff may be intercepted by the State of Utah and 
applied to existing child support arrearages. This income withholding 
procedure shall apply to existing and future payors. All withheld income 
shall be submitted to the Office of Recovery Services, P.O. Box 45011, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84145-0011, until such time as the Plaintiff no longer owes 
child support to the Defendant. 
3. That each party is hereby restrained and enjoined from bothering, 
harassing, annoying, threatening, or harming the other party at the other's 
place of residence, employment, or any other place. 
4. That the Plaintiff is hereby ordered to maintain as current, and 
hold the Defendant harmless from liability on, all debts, payments and 
obligations of the parties during the pendency of this action. 
5. That the Plaintiff is hereby ordered to maintain all present health 
and medical coverage for the benefit of the parties' minor child, and to 
provide the Defendant with any necessary forms and information to effect 
continued coverage. 
6. That a custody evaluation shall be performed, and both parties 
shall cooperate as necessary to insure its completion, by a mutually agreed 
upon evaluator. Such evaluation shall be commenced within forty-five (45) 
days of the date of this Order and the expense for such evaluation shall be 
paid two/thirds (2/3) by Plaintiff and one/third (1/3) by Defendant. 
DATED this day of , 1988. 
BY THE COURT 
THE HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
On this day of , 1988, I deposited in the United 
States Mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order 
on Order to Show Cause to Mitchell Barker and Evan Hurst, Attorneys for 
Plaintiff, at 2870 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692. 
David S. Dolowitz (0899) 
Julie A. Bryan (4805) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
525 East 100 South 
Fifth Floor 
P. O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Attorneys for defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MICHAEL JON REYNOLDS, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
JENNIFER FRANKS REYNOLDS, 
Defendant. 
) ORDER ON OBJECTION TO 
) COMMISSIONER' S RULINGS 
) Civil No. D88-944 
) Judge David S. Young 
Plaintiff's objection to the Recommendation of Domestic 
Relations Commissioner Sandra Peuler and defendant' s counter 
objection to said recommendation came on regularly for hearing 
before the Honorable David S. Young on October 17, 1988 at 9: 00 
a.m. Plaintiff was present and was represented by his counsel, 
Evan R. Hurst and Mitchell R. Barker. Defendant was present and 
represented by her counsel, Julie A. Bryan. Having reviewed the 
pleadings and heard arguments of the parties, it is hereby 
ORDERED: 
1. The Court adopts the Commissioner' s Recommendation and 
hereby reduces the defendant7 s support obligation from $300. 00 
per month to $150.00 per month commencing with the month of 
October, 1988. 
2. The Court adopts the Commissioner' s Recommendation 
that plaintiff will report, in writing, to defendant' s counsel on 
a monthly basis, as to his efforts to obtain employment. 
3. The plaintiff shall have thirty (30) days to pay two-
thirds (2/3) of the custody evaluation as previously ordered by 
the Court on or about May 2, 1988. 
DATED this ^<T- day of November, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG / 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 15th day of November, 1988, I 
caused to be mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, 
postage prepaid, to: 
Evan R. Hurst 
Mitchell R. Barker 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692 
(td/j ab/reynold ord) 
n
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E X H I B I T " H" 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ [0899] 
MICHAEL S. EVANS [1015] 
Attorney for Defendant 
of and for 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
525 East First South, #500 
P. 0. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-0008 
Telephone: [801] 532-2666 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * 
MICHAEL JON REYNOLDS, : 
: MOTION FOR ORDER TO 
Plaintiff, : SHOW CAUSE IN RE CONTEMPT 
vs. : 
: Civil No. D88-944 
JENNIFER FRANK REYNOLDS, : 
: Judge: David S. Young 
Defendant. : 
* * * * * * * * * * 
THE DEFENDANT IN THE ABOVE MATTER, hereby moves this Court 
to issue an Order to Show Cause in Re Contempt requiring the 
Plaintiff to appear at a date and time certain, and there to show 
cause, if any he has, why: 
1. Judgment should not be entered against him in the sum 
of $625.00 for child support due and owing but unpaid from June, 
1988, through August, 1988. 
2. Plaintiff s pleadings be stricken insofar as they 
request that Plaintiff be awarded the care, custody and control 
of the parties' minor child. 
3. Plaintiff be found in contempt for his willful failure 
and refusal to pay child support and to initiate a custody 
evaluation as previously ordered by the Court. 
Said Motion is based upon the grounds and for the reasons 
that Plaintiff has willfully failed and refused to pay anything 
as and for child support, despite the Court' s previous Order the 
Plaintiff pay the sum of $300 per month, and Plaintiff has 
willfully failed and refused to initiate a custody evaluation 
within forty-five days of the Court' s prior Order. Further, said| 
Motion is supported by Plaintiff s Affidavit, which is filed 
herewith. 
DATED this the it day of (^jjUtoTTS 1988. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
By: Kl^Si A W ^ 
MICHAEL S. EVANS, 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE QF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing 
MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE IN RE CONTEMPT to be mailed, 
postage prepaid, on this the /:*^ day of ^gZ^TZ^^&C- , 1988, 
to the following individuals at the addresses indicated: 
Mitchell Ronald Barker 
Ronald C. Barker 
2970 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692 
.^C 
^7 
REYNOLDS. MT1\HB 
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DAVID S. DOLOWITZ [0899] 
MICHAEL S. EVANS [1015] 
Attorney for Defendant 
of and for 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
525 East First South, #500 
P. 0. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-0008 
Telephone: [801] 532-2666 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * 
MICHAEL JON REYNOLDS, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
JENNIFER FRANK REYNOLDS, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT' S AFFIDAVIT 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
IN RE CONTEMPT 
Civil No. D88-944 
Judge: David S. Young 
* * * * * * * * * * 
STATE OF UTAH 
(SS. 
County of Salt Lake) 
COMES NOW, JENNIFER REYNOLDS, being first duly sworn, 
deposes and states as follows: 
1. She is the Defendant in the above-entitled Action. 
2. On or about May 2, 1988, this Court entered an Order 
to Show Cause. 
3. Pursuant to said Order, Plaintiff was required to pay 
II 
II 
li to Defendant the sum of $300 per month as and for support of the 
| parties' minor child. 
Ij 4. Defendant paid only $275 for the month of June, 1988, 
' i 
j  and has paid or offered to pay nothing for the months of July and 
j August, 1988. 
! 5, She is in need of such child support payments to 
i 
jj adequately provide for the parties' minor child and believes 
Plaintiff's failure to abide by the Court's prior Order is 
jj willful and intentional. 
6. Pursuant to said Order/ the parties were required to 
cooperate in the performance of a Custody Evaluation to be 
I commenced within forty-five days of the Court' s Order, with 
jj Plaintiff to pay two-thirds of the expenses of said evaluation 
j| and Defendant to pay one-third of such expense. 
I 7. She caused to be forwarded to Plaintiff s attorney a 
check in the sum of $166. 67, made payable to Mr. Kim Peterson, 
M. S. W., which amount represented one-third of the retainer 
j necessary to initiate such custody evaluation. 
il 
8. Plaintiff has willfully failed and refused to pay his 
two-thirds share of the retainer necessary to initiate the 
J custody evaluation, and no such evaluation has been commenced. 
9. The pending divorce Action, particularly Plaintiff s 
I refusal to agree that she may be awarded the permanent care, 
custody and control of the parties' minor child, has caused her 
I - 2 -
and continues to cause her emotional distress, and is disruptive 
to the relationship of £he parties hereto, and their minor child. 
DATED thi day of V^V-f^f> 1988. 
C V-JL^. 
iQ REYNOLDS/ 
Of 
JENNIFER 
De fendant/Af fi ant 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this the day 
Wft/rrr^ > 1 9 8 8 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC s? 
Residing at: S ^ ^ ^ ^ y L-S-K^S^/ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing 
DEFENDANT' S AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ORDER TO SHOW 
CAUSE IN RE CONTEMPT t;o be mailed, postage prepaid, on this the 
/ ^ day of &*r.^7?2&&&£- . 1988, to the following individuals 
at the addresses indicated: 
Mitchell R. Barker 
Ronald C. Barker 
2970 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692 
REYNOLDS AF1NHB 
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